Politics, security, and (mis)perceptions of Venezuelan migration to Guyana
Politics, security, and (mis)perceptions of Venezuelan migration to Guyana
Despite perceptions, Venezuelans in Guyana are not spies or invaders, and data shows they commit crimes at lower rates than their share of the total population
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Guyana and Venezuela’s longstanding border controversy continues to await a ruling at the International Court of Justice, with recent months seeing tensions flare, subside, and flare again amid fiery rhetoric, troop mobilizations, and internationally-brokered dialogue between the two countries. Guyana remains firmly in control over the Essequibo territory, but these recent tensions have sparked greater concern in the country over the potential of an incursion by their next-door neighbor.
This conflict complicates the lives of the estimated 21,676 Venezuelans living in Guyana. Last October, opposition parties criticized the lack of regulation over migration across the country’s porous border, with Opposition Leader Aubrey Norton arguing “Most of these refugees now reside in our sparsely populated hinterland regions, should they become a majority in any sizeable area of our territory, Guyana could face a threat of possible annexation of these areas by Venezuela.” This sentiment has been echoed in both traditional media outlets and social media, and has had a tangible impact on Venezuelans’ lives: some have reported that the recent tensions have stoked xenophobia and negatively impacted their businesses.
Despite fears, Venezuelan immigrants are just that: immigrants. There have been no credible reports of Venezuelan military or intelligence personnel crossing into Guyana. Venezuelans in Guyana are regular civilians and do not pose a security threat. They fled a humanitarian crisis in their home country, a fact duly recognized by the Guyanese government, which has facilitated easy access to temporary and renewable regularization.
In addition to political concerns surrounding borders and militarized security threats, some have claimed that Venezuelans are bringing crime to Guyana. In recent weeks, Minister of Home Affairs Robeson Benn remarked that Venezuelans are the fastest-growing foreign nationality in Guyana’s prison system and hinted at links between rising Venezuelan migration and crime. These types of claims attributing crime to migrants have proliferated across Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years but have been consistently disproven by research across the region—and globe—including in nearby countries such as Chile and Peru.
Indeed, the available data in Guyana shows that Venezuelan immigrants are less likely than other Guyanese residents to take part in crime, as reflected by their lower imprisonment rates. Public data is limited, but according to a January 2024 article in Kaieteur News citing Minister Benn, there were a total of 23 Venezuelan men in Guyanese prisons out of a total male prison population of “around 2,240.” According to those numbers, Venezuelans make up just 1% of the male prison population in Guyana. Overall, Venezuelans represent close to 3% of the country’s total population, according to official statistics.
More generally, too, crime and violence in Guyana are not correlated to increasing migration. The homicide rate per 100,000 persons has more or less fluctuated around 15 to 20 for two decades, with the rapid growth of the Venezuelan population in the 2010s having no real impact on dynamics. Venezuelan organized crime does not feature in Guyana, and the infamous Tren de Aragua gang does not appear to have a presence in the country. Moreover, as InSight Crime noted in their 2023 Annual Homicide Roundup, it is “unlikely” that the increase in homicides in Guyana in 2023 was related to organized crime. Venezuelans are not the drivers of crime in Guyana, but rather, more likely the victims: many Venezuelans, particularly members of the Indigenous Warao community, have been exploited and forced to work as illegal miners in southern Guyana.
Contrary to some perceptions, Venezuelan immigrants in Guyana have not, and do not, pose a security threat to the country. The available data shows they commit crimes at lower rates than their share of the total population, and there is no substantiated reason to believe they represent a hidden threat to the country’s borders and sovereignty. As James Bosworth argued in World Politics Review earlier this month, posturing from Venezuela’s Maduro government serves more as a smokescreen for domestic troubles than as a real, tangible danger for Guyana. Nonetheless, growing tensions have created real impacts on narratives surrounding Venezuelan migration in Guyana, mirroring social cohesion issues and (mis)perceptions of migrant criminality seen elsewhere across the Americas.